Some Comments on the Impact of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on European Employment Relations by Wakkie, Peter N.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-1979
Some Comments on the Impact of the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on
European Employment Relations
Peter N. Wakkie
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter N. Wakkie, Some Comments on the Impact of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on European Employment Relations,
2 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 75 (1979).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol2/iss1/5
Some Comments on the Impact
of the OECD Guidelines For
Multinational Enterprises
on European Employment
Relations
by Peter N. Wakkie*
I. INTRODUCTION**
In recent years the multinational enterprise has been in the
center of public attention. Developing countries in particular are
often suspicious of the financial, economic, social, and political
power with which the multinational enterprise is credited.' In trade-
union circles the multinational enterprise has also been the subject
of critical discussion. Nevertheless, most developing countries wel-
come investments by multinational enterprises in their countries as
a means of increasing the volume of employment and standard of
living and facilitating the transfer of advanced Western technology.2
This love-hate relationship has several causes. First, there have
been a few isolated cases of questionable behavior by multinational
enterprises which have been generalized. A second cause may be the
multinational enterprise's often complicated and, to the nonexpert,
frequently Byzantine organizational structure. Finally, the multina-
tional enterprise must conform to the divergent national laws, regu-
lations, and customs of various host countries. The existence of local
controls often conflicts with the multinational enterprise's natural
desire for intergovernmental coordination of policies, laws, and reg-
ulations which control multinational operations. This conflict be-
* Mr. Wakkie is resident partner of the New York branch office of the law firm of
deBrauw en Helbach, which is based in The Hague, The Netherlands. He holds a Master of
Laws degree from the University of Utrecht. Mr. Wakkie is active in the ABA, the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York, the Netherlands Order of Attorneys, and the Order
of Attorneys at the Supreme Court of the Netherlands.
** This article is based on a presentation by the author at the American Bar Association
National Institute on "Worldwide Legal Challenges to U.S. Transnational Businesses" held
December 15-16, 1978, in New York City. The Guidelines for this article are updated through
February 1979.
1. See generally Gordon, The Impact of the Multinational Corporation in the Third
World, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MULTINATIONAL CORPO'ATIONs 21 (K. Simmonds ed. 1977).
2. See Weisglas, Gedragsregels voor Multinationale Ondernemingen, in M.MNDBLAD
VooR ACCOUNTANCY EN BEDRiJFSLEVEN 425 (1977).
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tween the need for local control and international unification often
leads to tension.3
On the international level, this continuing debate about the
role of the multinational enterprise has tended to polarize along
economic lines. The less developed countries stress the need for
stringent local controls on multinationals while the developed coun-
tries favor some restraint upon such controls.4 It has also been recog-
nized that any viable set of universal guidelines must ultimately
spring from a synthesis of these two views. 5 While the less developed
countries have expressed their thoughts on such guidelines in the
United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations, the
governments of the countries united in the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have published a
joint Declaration on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises.' Before discussing the importance of this document,
it may be instructive to describe the OECD in a few words.
II. THi HISTORY AND STucruRE OF THE OECD
The OECD was created on December 14, 1960, as successor to
the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).
This last mentioned organization, established on April 16, 1948, was
created to administer the funds made available to sixteen European
countries by the United States under the so-called Marshall plan
and to promote the associated program of European cooperation.
After termination of the Marshall plan, non-European industrial-
ized countries gradually became members of the OEEC (which had
meanwhile become the OECD).7 The present members of the OECD
are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United King-
dom, and the United States.
The OECD has thus become an organization for economic con-
3. Id. at 425.
4. See Perlmutter, Perplexing Routes to M.N.E. Legitimacy: Codes of Conduct for Tech-
nology Transfer, 11 STAN. J. INST. STUD. 169 (1976).
5. Id. at 190-93.
6. OECD Doc. PRESS/A(76)20 (1976), app. I infra [hereinafter cited as Declaration].
It took 18 months of preparation to draft a code that was acceptable to the divergent political
views. Eventually, all the OECD member states except Turkey agreed to the code.
7. Weisglas, supra note 2, at 429.
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sultation and cooperation between the governments of the Western
industrialized world which enjoys considerable authority. The high-
est authority within the OECD is vested in the Council, which con-
sists of representatives from all the member states. The Secretary-
General of the OECD is the chairman of the Council. Within the
Council there is an executive committee of varying composition
which deals with the current affairs. The Council may create com-
mittees for various purposes and by resolution of January 21, 1975,
exercised this power to appoint the Committee on International
Investments and Multinational Enterprises (IME Committee).'
The IME Committee, broadly speaking, has been assigned the tasks
of supervising the implementation of the Declaration on Interna-
tional Investment and Multinational Enterprises and coordinating
intergovernmental consultation on this subject.
Since the OECD is an organization of governments, business
and labor organizations cannot be members. However, employers'
organizations and trade unions from the various OECD member
states have organized the Business and Industry Advisory Commit-
tee (BIAC) and Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC), respec-
tively. Both BIAC and TUAC enjoy a consultative status at the
OECD.
I. THE OECD DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
The June 21, 1976, OECD Declaration on International Invest-
ment and Multinational Enterprises consists of five articles, which
generally recognize the positive contributions that multinational
enterprises have made to international investment and economic
and social progress. The signatories' declared aim is to encourage
these positive contributions and to minimize and resolve difficulties
which may arise from the operations of multinational enterprises.'0
In article 1 of the Declaration, the governments jointly recommend
that multinational enterprises operating in their territories observe
the Guidelines as set forth in the annex thereto." The phrase
"operating in their territories" indicates that the OECD member
states intend to limit the territorial application of the Guidelines to
8. Resolution of the Council Establishing a Committee on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises, OECD Doc. C(74)247 (1975).
9. Declaration, supra note 6.
10. Id. paras. 1-4.
11. Id. art. I.
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the OECD member states themselves. However, in the third para-
graph of the considerations which introduce the Guidelines, the
OECD member states expressly endorse the principle of interna-
tional cooperation with nonmember countries in this area. This is
apparently a reference to efforts undertaken by the United Nations
Commission on Transnational Corporations to draft a worldwide
code of conduct applying to OECD, communist, and developing
countries. 2
Article II of the Declaration imposes upon each government the
obligation to treat foreign controlled enterprises operating in its
territory no less favorably than domestic enterprises." This concept
is referred to in the Declaration as the concept of "national treat-
ment" and prohibits a government from discriminating between
foreign controlled and domestically controlled companies." But a
recent report, made at the initiative of the IME Committee, reveals
that each OECD member state continues to maintain discrimina-
tory measures in one or more of the following areas: tax obligations,
rights to official aids and subsidies, access to local bank credit and
capital markets, government purchasing and public contracts, in-
vestment by established foreign controlled enterprises, and the own-
ership and operation of aircraft and vessels. 5
Although the wording of article II indicates that each govern-
ment should abolish such discriminatory measures forthwith, this
literal interpretation was apparently not intended. The OECD
Council resolution on national treatment 6 indicates that the gov-
ernments have agreed merely to notify the IME Committee of exist-
ing and new exceptions to the principle of national treatment. In the
case of new exceptions, an explanation of the reasons therefor and
the proposed duration thereof is required."7 The IME Committee is
12. ECOSOC Res. 1913, 57 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. (IA) 3, U.N. Doc. E/5570/Add. 1
(1975).
13. See Declaration, supra note 6, art. II. It should be noted that discriminatory mea-
sures taken by member states which are "consistent with their needs to maintain public
order, to protect their essential security interests and to fulfill commitments relating to
international peace and security" are condoned by article II (1) of the Declaration. Neverthe-
less, it would seem that few discriminatory measures fall into these categories.
14. Id.
15. OECD, National Treatment for Foreign Controlled Enterprises Established in
OECD Countries. The decision to de-restrict this document was made on September 15,
1978. See also OECD, International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, OECD Doc.
21(76)04/1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as International Investment].
16. Decision of the Council on National Treatment, app. IV infra. See also International
Investment, supra note 15, at 21.
17. Id. arts. 1-2.
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expected to make proposals to extend the future application of na-
tional treatment. 8
It may be somewhat disappointing to multinationals that what
seems to be a firm commitment on the part of governments to abol-
ish discriminatory measures forthwith is essentially a mere notifica-
tion procedure. Some OECD members do not interpret the responsi-
bilities which they have asked multinationals to observe in this
lenient way."
Articles II and IV of the Declaration deal with international
investment incentives, disincentives and consultation procedures,
respectively, and these have been implemented by OECD Council
resolutions." The OECD Council resolution on consultation proce-
dures contains a provision to the effect that the IME Committee,
when reviewing the application of the Guidelines, "shall not reach
conclusions on the conduct of individual enterprises."2' Finally, ar-
ticle V provides for review of the above matters within three years.
IV. THE OECD GUIDELINs FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
The Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 22 are attached to
the aforementioned Declaration and, together with the Declaration
and the OECD Council resolutions, are intended to form a homoge-
neous set of rules. The Guidelines consist of an introduction fol-
lowed by these sections: General Policies, Disclosure of Information,
Competition, Financing, Taxation, Employment and Industrial
Relations, and Science and Technology.
The innovative section on employment and industrial relations
has generated the most controversy and will be of the most import
to the international law practitioner. The scope and status of this
section, and indeed of the Guidelines themselves, is unclear. Article
8 of the introduction to the Guidelines notes that "a precise legal
18. Id. art. 4.
19. See note 77 infra and accompanying text.
20. Declaration, supra note 6, arts. HI-IV.
21. Decision of the Council on Inter-Governmental Consultation Procedures on the
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, app. III infra, art. 3 [hereinafter cited as Inter-
Governmental Consultation Procedures Council].
22. OECD Doc. PRESS/A(76)20 (1976), app. II infra [hereinafter cited as Guidelines).
Article 5 of the introduction to the Guidelines states that, "It he initial phase of the co-
operation programme is composed of a Declaration and three Decisions promulgated simul-
taneously as they are complementary and inter-connected, in respect of guidelines for multi-
national enterprises, national treatment for foreign-controlled enterprises and international
investment incentives and disincentives." (Emphasis added.) The Guidelines are an annex
to the Declaration and form an integral part thereof.
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definition of multinational enterprises is not required for the pur-
poses of the Guidelines. '12 Nevertheless, article 8 describes the
characteristics of the multinational enterprise. It notes that multi-
national enterprises usually comprise
companies or other entities . . . established in different countries
and so linked that one or more of them may be able to exercise a
significant influence over the activities of others and in particular
to share knowledge and resources with the others.2
This description, it seems, makes sufficiently clear which entities
fall within the scope of the Guidelines.
Article 8 contains another important concept which defines the
scope of the Guidelines. Since within a multinational enterprise
decisions are not always made at the locus or the level where they
will have effect, the second part of article 8 provides that
[the] guidelines are addressed to the various entities within the
multinational enterprise (parent companies and/or local entities)
according to the actual distribution of responsibilities among them
on the understanding that they will co-operate and provide assis-
tance to one another as necessary to facilitate observance of the
guidelines."
The Belgian government has construed this provision to mean
that where the parent company exercises significant influence over
its subsidiary and makes the decision to close it down, the parent
company must ensure that the subsidiary can meet its responsibili-
ties to its employees to the extent the Guidelines impose such res-
ponsibilities." This interpretation seems to be supported by refer-
ence to the last sentence of article 8, which provides as follows:
The word "enterprise" as used in these guidelines refers to these
various entities in accordance with their responsibilities.,
Article 9 contains another important concept which extends the
sweep of the Guidelines by providing that observance of the Guide-
23. Id. art. 8. This statement must be understood in the context of article 6 of the same
introduction, which provides that "[ojbservance of the guidelines is voluntary and not
legally enforceable." It is indeed understandable that, since the Guidelines do not purport to
be a legally enforceable instrument, a precise legal definition of what constitutes a
"multinational enterprise" has been omitted. See Schmitthoff, Group Liability of
Multinationals, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 71 (K. Simmonds ed.
1977).
24. Guidelines, supra note 22, art. 8.
25. Id.
26. See notes 41-58 infra and accompanying text.
27. Guidelines, supra note 22, art. 8.
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lines is recommended to both multinational and domestic enter-
prises whenever relevant to both2 5 Obviously, those Guidelines
which presuppose the existence of international activities cannot
apply to domestic enterprises which have no operations outside
their country of domicile. However, many of the Guidelines are also
relevant to domestic enterprises.2 In this connection the converse
question arises as to whether an OECD member state may demand
that a multinational enterprise operating in its territory observe a
Guideline when the government does not demand the same compli-
ance from a domestic enterpriseY'
V. GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE SECTION ON EMPLOYMENT AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
The controversial nature of the Guideline sections with respect
to employment and industrial relations has already been men-
tioned .3 The first article of this section recognizes the right of em-
ployees to be represented by trade unions and other bona fide organ-
izations of employees and imposes on the multinational enterprise
the obligation to negotiate with such trade union or other bona fide
organization.2 The language of this article seems to indicate that
not every organization which labels itself a trade union qualifies
thereunder as a bargaining partner. To qualify as such, the trade
union must "represent" employees of the enterprise concerned.3 It
is unclear when a trade union satisfies this requirement under the
article. This question must apparently be resolved on the basis of
the law and practice of each country where such an issue arises.
The third article requires the submission of information on the
multinational enterprise as a whole.3 This requirement appears
superfluous, since the section on disclosure of information requires
28. Id. art. 9.
29. See generally, OECD, THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERIsEs: A
BUSINss APPRAISAL (1977) [hereinafter cited as A BuSINESS APPRAIsAL].
It should be emphasized that there are very few elements in the Guidelines that
apply to uniquely international types of operations or activities in which only mul-
tinational companies would be involved. The kinds of responsibilities imposed on
multinationals here are simply international parallels of what would be proper
standards of business practice domestically.
Id. at 15.
30. See note 52 infra and accompanying text.
31. See notes 22-23 infra and accompanying text.
32. Guidelines, supra note 22, art. 1.
33. Id.
34. Id. art. 3.
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more extensive information on the multinational as a whole. The
fourth and fifth articles will probably not raise many interpretive
problems.5 The sixth and seventh articles provide for notice to em-
ployees in the event of a change in operations which affects employ-
ment and for a prohibition on discriminatory hiring practices, re-
spectively.34
The eighth article has been the subject of discussion in a case
involving the Hertz Rent-a-Car Company.37 In October 1976, Hertz
employees in Denmark went on strike in support of a demand for a
salary increase. The company subsequently moved employees from
its other branches in Europe to keep its operation in Denmark go-
ing. Although the wording of article 8 does not directly prohibit the
"import" of employees to the plant affected by the strike, some
have contended that this practice unfairly influences the outcome
of labor disputesl and therefore violates the spirit of this article.
This contention is open to dispute, since it may be argued that a
company has the right to move employees from other branches in
order to minimize its damages as much as possible. In addition,
where only a percentage of the employees are on strike, as is fre-
quently the case, it may be maintained that the company is acting
in the best interests of those who are not on strike by keeping the
business going.
The ninth article has given rise to some concern, because labor
organizations have construed it to require negotiations regarding
collective bargaining between the international trade unions and
the top management of multinationals.39 A contrary construction
seems more in accord with the language of article 9 itself. First,
since the article refers to "authorized representatives of their em-
ployees," the international trade union will seldom, if ever, qualify
as a bargaining partner under the Guidelines. The international
trade union rarely receives a mandate from national unions to
conduct collective bargaining on behalf of the employees of such
national unions. Conflicting national interests and the desire of na-
tional unions to retain their autonomy have prevented this develop-
ment so far. Apart from this, it is hard to see how one international
35. Id. arts. 4-5.
36. Id. arts. 6-7.
37. See A BUSINESS APPRAISAL, supra note 29, at 109.
38. The matter was debated at the European Assembly in Luxembourg and a resolution
was passed condemning the misuse of "free movement of labour." Id.
39. See generally R. BLANPAIN, THE BADGER CASE AND THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTI-
NATIONAL ENTERPRISES, annex V (1977) [hereinafter cited as BLANPAIN].
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trade union could effectively bargain on behalf of employees in dif-
ferent countries, where there are different wages, social security
systems, taxes and employment conditions. The language of the
Guidelines may be construed as recognizing that this task is more
properly left to national labor unions. In addition, article 9 does not
define the level of management at which negotiations must be con-
ducted. As long as those who sit around the table on the company
side are authorized to make decisions on the issues under considera-
tion, the requirements of the Guidelines are satisfied. Much will
therefore depend on the decision-making process within each mul-
tinational enterprise. It may be assumed that, in general, the man-
agement of a subsidiary has a rather broad power of attorney to
make decisions in negotiations with trade unions on employment
conditions and related issues concerning the subsidiary.0
VI. THE SECTION ON EMPLOYMENT AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN PRACTICE
A. The Badger Case
The section on employment and industrial relations, and in
particular article 6 thereof, has drawn attention in connection with
the Badger case." Badger concerned the closing down of Badger
(Belgium) N.V., a subsidiary of The Badger Company, Inc. (Bad-
ger), based on Massachusetts, which itself is an affiliate of Ray-
theon, Incorporated. As a result of the Belgian company's failure,
its 250 employees were dismissed, although some of them were sub-
sequently hired by other Badger affiliates."2 Under Belgian law, dis-
missed employees are generally entitled to substantial severance
payments. The size of these payments depends on the age, function,
salary, length of service and the likelihood of obtaining future em-
ployment among those affected. In this case, employees claimed the
equivalent of approximately $6 million. Badger (Belgium) N.V.,
which had been a solvent company, was able to pay only half this
amount and went bankrupt. 3 The Belgian government, joined by
trade unions, turned to the American parent, Badger, with the re-
quest that it supply its subsidiary with funds to pay the other half
of the required severance payments. Badger initially refused, invok-
ing the principle of limited liability afforded to the shareholders of
40. A BusmIss APPRAISAL, supra note 29, at 118-21.
41. See BLANPAIN, supra note 39.
42. Id. at 51.
43. Id. at 76.
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a limited liability corporation under Belgian law." The Belgian gov-
ernment, however, continued to exert pressure on Badger and fi-
nally brought the matter up for discussion in the IME Committee.
The Belgian government contended that under the OECD
Guidelines, Badger was responsible for severance payments to the
employees of its subsidiary. The Belgian position relied upon article
8 of the introduction to the Guidelines and article 6 of the section
on employment and industrial relations. 5 It was submitted that
article 8 obliges the parent company to enable its subsidiary to meet
its obligations to its employees, in the event that the parent com-
pany, as was Badger, is responsible for the decision to close down
the subsidiary. Article 6 defines the scope of these obligations. It
provides inter alia for cooperation with the employee representa-
tives and appropriate governmental authorities "so as to mitigate
to the maximum extent practicable adverse effects" on the dis-
missed employees. These last words, it was submitted, imply that
Badger was obligated to ensure that the dismissed employees re-
ceived no less than the amount they were entitled to under Belgian
law.4" It is interesting to note that the trade unions accused Badger
of having maneuvered its subsidiary into an unprofitable position,
forcing it to accept orders without adequate remuneration." How-
ever, these and other contentions have been disputed by Badger,
and their correctness or incorrectness has never been determined;
the only facts which appear to have been established are that
Badger, by itself and through its Dutch affiliate, had always exer-
cised significant control over the subsidiary and was responsible for
the decision to close the subsidiary. The IME Committee discussed
the Badger case in its meeting of March 31, 1977; Badger was not
represented."8 Although the minutes of this meeting are confiden-
tial, the Belgian delegation emerged with a statement that the con-
clusions of the debate were as follows:
1. the subsidiary enterprise is obliged to live up to the national
laws of the country in which it operates; this is the Belgian law;
44. CODE OF COMMERCE [CDCJ bk. I, tit. IX, art. 26 (Belg.).
45. BLANPAiN, supra note 39, at 114, 131.
46. Id. at 105-07, 114.
47. Id. at 95-96.
48. Inter-Governmental Consultation Procedures Council, supra note 21, art. 3 provides
that individual enterprises can express their views concerning the application of the Guide-
lines if invited to do so by the IME Committee at the proposal of a member state. The Belgian
government proposed that the IME Committee invite Badger to present its views on the
Guidelines but the Committee did not extend an invitation.
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2. the OECD guidelines refer to the company as a whole;
3. the parent company is, under certain circumstances, morally
responsible for the liabilities of its local entities."'
Subsequent to the IME Committee meeting, the Belgian govern-
ment and Badger entered into negotiations on the size of the supple-
ment Badger should pay to its subsidiary. The settlement ulti-
mately agreed upon amounted to approximately 25 million Belgian
francs (approximately U.S. $650,000). This is substantially less
than the amount originally demanded. However, Badger estab-
lished an important precedent among multinational enterprises by
recognizing the principle of responsibility to its subsidiary's
employees.
B. Badger and the Principle of Equal
Treatment for Foreign and Domestic Entities
The principle of national treatment was an important issue in
the Badger case. Under the Guidelines, domestic and foreign con-
trolled enterprises are subject to the same standards with respect to
their conduct wherever the Guidelines are relevant to both.5' Fur-
thermore, each government has assumed the responsibility to treat
foreign controlled enterprises no less favorably than domestic enter-
prises. 2 It then follows from these two propositions that the Belgian
government could rightly exert pressure on Badger only if it also
exerted similar pressure on domestic shareholders of other Belgian
companies under the same circumstances. A representative of
Badger voiced this position to the Belgian government:
[Off the several bankruptcies of Belgian national companies
within the recent past, I am not aware of any accusation or pres-
sure put on the shareholders of these companies to be responsible
for debts over and above the net worth of the company. I have
been led to believe that in cases of bankruptcy of national compa-
nies the indemnity fund has made up any deficit not covered by
the assets of the company, to meet severance pay of employees. "5
The Belgian government did not satisfactorily answer this state-
ment." The Belgian Secretary of State at one time said that his
49. BLANPAIN, supra note 39, at 116-17.
50. Id. at 123-24.
51. Guidelines, supra note 22, art. 9.
52. Declaration, supra note 6, art. 19.
53. BLANPAIN, supra note 39, at 109.
54. See Aalders, Sociale Gedsagsrels Voor Multinationale in SOCIAL MAANDBLAD AREEID
(1978).
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views concerning the responsibility of the parent company would be
the same if both the parent company and the subsidiary were
Belgian enterprises. 5  This statement implied that the Belgian gov-
ernment had never before undertaken action such as that in the
Badger case, although the closing down and subsequent bankruptcy
of subsidiaries is not an exceptional phenomenon. There have been
no subsequent reports of similar governmental pressure applied to
domestic shareholders of closed down, bankrupt Belgian subsidiar-
ies. The Belgian government's actions can therefore hardly be recon-
ciled with the principle of national treatment.
C. The Role of the IME Committee
Another aspect of the Badger case which merits further consid-
eration is the role of the IME Committee. The Committee decided
to hear the principles involved in the Badger case, although by its
own rules, it "shall not reach conclusions on the conduct of individ-
ual enterprises."56 The Committee defended its action by noting:
The discussions could not and did not focus on the merits of the
case; the Committee did not examine or question the factual situa-
tion but accepted the facts as put forward by the Belgian govern-
ment and used them as an illustration which could help to clarify
the meaning of a text the Committee itself has negotiated some
months ago.s?
The Committee's approach is understandable, since clarifying
the rather vague Guidelines without using concrete examples is not
easy. Nevertheless, the Committee's approach has disadvantages.
Public and press will .not always realize, or indeed want to realize,
that the Committee does not investigate the facts as presented to
it, and that the Committee's decision is not binding upon the partic-
ular multinational enterprise utilized as an "example." Indeed,
after the Belgian delegation summarized the debate of the IME
Committee in the Badger case, the Belgian news media hailed the
outcome of this meeting as a moral condemnation of Badger, 51 al-
though according to its own statement, the Committee did not ex-
amine or question the facts presented by the Belgian government
and disputed, for the most part, by Badger, which was unrepre-
sented at the Committee hearing.
55. BLANPAN, supra note 39, at 115 n.130.
56. Inter-Governmental Consultation Procedures Council, supra note 21, art. 3.
57. Vogelaar, The Guidelines in Practice, 86 OECD OBSERVER 7, 8 (1977).
58. BLANPAIN, supra note 39, at 117.
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D. The Batco Case
The Batco case arose from the actions of Batco Nederland B.V.
(Batco) an affiliate of the British multinational, British American
Tobacco Company. In December 1977, Batco announced that it
would close down its Amsterdam plant; as a result, more than 200
employees would become jobless. The cigarette production of the
Amsterdam plant was to be taken over by a Belgian subsidiary of
the British American Tobacco Company.
A local trade union initiated successful litigation in the Dutch
courts. The president of the Amsterdam District Court granted an
injunction against Batco on March 9, 1978, prohibiting the company
from implementing its disinvestment plans for a period of one year.
The president held inter alia that Batco's management had not
timely and adequately consulted the local employees' council con-
cerning the contemplated measures." Such prompt and adequate
consultation is required by article 25 of the Dutch Act on Employ-
ees' Councils.
The merits of the president's opinion are outside the scope of
this article, since the decision was grounded exclusively on a viola-
tion of Dutch law connected with the particular circumstances of
the case. What is of interest, however, is the trade union's express
allegation that the OECD Guidelines had also been violated. The
president declined to address this contention in his opinion.10 A
logical inference of this avoidance is that the Dutch court considers
the Guidelines to be voluntary and not legally binding on the com-
pany.
The Dutch government placed the Batco decision before the
IME Committee to determine whether the Guidelines limit a multi-
national's ability to make disinvestment decisions where, as the
trade union maintains, the entity to be closed down is profitable. It
is to be expected that the IME will answer in accordance with the
terms of the Guidelines themselves, that the Guidelines do not limit
the multinational's right to discontinue its investment in a certain
country.
It should be noted that the section on employment and in-
dustrial relations, in particular article 6 thereof, is not concerned
with disinvestment decisions as such, but only with the conse-
quences thereof, which must be mitigated to the extent possible.
59. See Slagter, TVVS ONDERNEMINGSRECHT 164 (1978).
60. Id. at 165.
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Second, while the section on general policies"' demands attention to
the established general policy objectives, aims and priorities of the
member states with regard to economic and social progress, this
language does not specifically limit a multinational enterprise's
power to disinvest. The section merely urges that multinationals
take into account the interests of the member state concerned to the
extent possible, in undertaking a decision to disinvest. Though
article 5 prohibits a multinational enterprise from utilizing its affil-
iates to implement restrictive business practices, this provision
does not appear to apply to the majority of multinational disinvest-
ments.
The foregoing analysis should apply equally to the case in
which the closed down entity is a profitable one. Although the trade
union involved in the Batco case has submitted that the Amsterdam
plant demonstrated positive performance records and there are
no economic reasons to close it, it is hardly conceivable that anyone
would close a genuinely lucrative operation. Although the Amster-
dam plant as an isolated unit may have been profitable, there may
be equally compelling reasons, relating to the multinational as a
whole, which require the rationalization of operations, perhaps to
avoid serious problems which arise in other areas. Nothing in the
Guidelines purports to restrict a multinational's discretion to deter-
mine the profitability of a particular enterprise by reference to its
operations in other markets.
It must be borne in mind that while the Guidelines do not
appear to limit the multinational's ability to disinvest, the local
laws of each jurisdiction may provide some obstacles. For example,
in France, collective dismissals for economic reasons are subject to
prior approval of an administrative agency.2 Under French law, the
employer who sends letters of dismissal without having secured this
authorization may have to pay considerable fines and indemnities.
In the Netherlands, collective dismissals are also subject to the
approval of an administrative agency."e Failing such approval, the
employment contracts cannot be validly terminated. In Germany,
the employer must reach a compromise with the works council on
the amount of compensation to be paid for the disadvantages which
the employees will suffer as a consequence of the contemplated
disinvestment. 4 Failing agreement, an arbitration committee shall
decide the issue. Furthermore, the Council of the European Eco-
61. Guidelines, supra note 22, arts. 1-2.
62. Law of Jan. 3, 1975. nr. 75-5 [1975] (Fr.).
63. Law of Mar. 24, 1976, Gov't Gazette 223 119761 (Neth.).
64. German Works Council Act of 1972, paras. 111-12.
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nomic Community adopted a directive on collective dismissals on
February 17, 1975,15 which lays down certain minimum procedural
standards to be followed in the handling of redundancies. These
procedural standards entail the obligation to consult workers' repre-
sentatives on the contemplated measures in order to determine
means of avoiding collective redundancies or reducing the number
of workers affected and mitigating the consequences." Also, the
employer must notify the competent public authority and give all
relevant information, 7 and projected redundancies may not take
effect earlier than thirty days after this notification. 8
E. The Voluntary Character of the Guidelines
There is a noticeable and understandable tendency to treat the
Guidelines as if they are binding rules rather than nonbinding and
unenforceable recommendations." Indeed, as the result in the
Badger case demonstrates, in practice, the observance of the Guide-
lines may prove to be less optional than their terms would indicate.
It is entirely plausible that decision-makers within multinational
enterprises recognize that they must comply with the Guide-
lines-even with those provisions to which they do not agree-in
order to avoid adverse press publicity and trade union charges of
misbehavior. It must also be remembered in this connection that
the Guidelines have been jointly recommended by the governments
of twenty-three countries, which account for 60 percent of the
world's industrial production and 70 percent of its trade, and which
are the home countries for over 90 percent of the world's multina-
tional corporations.70 In addition, BIAC and TUAC have issued
statements in support of the Guidelines on behalf of the employer
and labor organizations, respectively. The United States Senate,7
the European Parliament, and the Council of Europe,7 2 as well as
many multinational enterprises, have also endorsed the Guidelines.
65. 18 0. J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 48) 29 (1975).
66. d. art. 2.
67. Id. art. 3.
68. Id. art. 4(1). See generally Hepple, Community Measures for the Protection of
Workers Against Dismissal, 14 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 489 (1977).
69. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
70. A BUSNESS APPRAiSAL, supra note 29, at 5.
71. S. Res. 516, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. S17598 (1976).
72. See EUR. PARL. RES., PB 0118 of May 16, 1976 (Apr. 19, 1977); EuR. CONSULT. ADV.
ASS'N, 14TH ORD. Sss., Res. no. 666 (1977); Eju. CONSULT, ADV. ASS'N, 28TH OR. SESS., Res.
no. 639 (1976).
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Because of this consensus, a multinational enterprise which flaunts
or ignores the Guidelines may do serious damage to its reputation.
VI. THE GUIDELINES AND THE UNITED
NATIONS CODE OF CONDUCT
The OECD Declaration and Guidelines possess independent
significance as embodiments of important concepts which both
Western governments and multinational corporations want to in-
clude in any future guidelines which may be codified by other organ-
izations. The most important of these concepts are the voluntary
character of the OECD Guidelines, the provisions covering obliga-
tions of multinationals and governments alike, and the principle of
equal, or national, treatment to multinational enterprises by host
country governments. 7 It is significant that these three points are
exactly those upon which there is the greatest difference of opinion
between the OECD member states and the developing countries in
the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations.
This commission was established in 1974 by the United Nations
Economic and Social Council to draft a worldwide code of conduct
for multinationals; the code is still a long way from completion. 7'
Many of the developing countries perceive the role of multinationals
in terms far different than those of the industrialized countries. 75
Developing countries feel that multinationals should contribute
to increasing the welfare and standard of living in their countries
and conform to their national policies, without the benefit of well
defined and objective standards to protect industrial and intellec-
tual property against arbitrary and discriminatory confiscation by
the host country. Consequently, the developing countries aim at a
mandatory rather than voluntary code, which would impose obliga-
tions upon multinationals, not upon host governments, and which
would not embody the concept of equal treatment of multinational
and domestic corporations by host countries. 6
73. A Businss APPRAISAL, supra note 29, at 108.
74. See UNCTAD, Draft Resolution on an International Code of Conduct on the Transfer
of Technology, Submitted by the Chairman of the General Committee, U.N. Doc. TD/L.
128, at 1 (1976); UNCTAD, Report of the Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive
Business Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/AC.5/6 (1976).
75. See Joelson, The Proposed International Codes of Conduct as Related to Restrictive
Business Practices, 8 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 837 (1976).
76. See Sanders, TVVS ONVxmRmNNosagcwr 257 (1978).
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VII. EXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS
Whatever the outcome following the review of the OECD
Declaration, Guidelines and OECD Council resolutions, it is reason-
able to expect that there will be pressure from various OECD mem-
ber states to expand the powers of the IME Committee, either by
explicitly giving the Committee the power to investigate the facts
of a case about which a complaint is made, or by giving the Commit-
tee the even wider power to investigate the facts of a case and render
a decision on the merits.
The grant of such adjudicatory powers would certainly deviate
from the original spirit of the Guidelines and such a move would be
likely to meet with strong opposition. The United States, in particu-
lar, can be expected to resist any attempt to convert the IME Com-
mittee into an international tribunal. Beyond the determined oppo-
sition from certain OECD members, there are other problems inher-
ent in such a step. In their present form, many of the Guidelines are
simply too vague to be of much assistance in judicial analysis. In
addition, there is the problem of implementing procedures for the
appointment of such an expanded tribunal, not to mention the hur-
dles involved in drafting a workable jurisdictional statute.
If opposition prevents the expansion of the IME Committee's
powers, particularly the power to investigate the facts of a particular
case about which a complaint is made, it is conceivable that some
member states will be moved to unilaterally incorporate certain of
the Guidelines into their municipal law, rendering them legally en-
forceable. Such a step would probably be delayed as long as possi-
ble, for fear of creating an adverse effect on foreign investment, but
some countries may be forced to such action if no progress can be
reported from the OECD front. The mere existence of the Guide-
lines indicates support for the principles which they embody. It is
only natural that certain governments may want to strengthen those
principles.
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APPENDIX I
DECLARATION
ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
(21st June 1976)
THE GOVERNMENTS OF OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES
CONSIDERING
that international investment has assumed increased import-
ance in the world economy and has considerably contributed to the
development of their countries;
that multinational enterprises play an important role in this
investment process;
that co-operation by Member countries can improve the foreign
investment climate, encourage the positive contribution which mul-
tinational enterprises can make to economic and social progress,
and minimize and resolve difficulties which may arise from their
various operations;
that, while continuing endeavors within the OECD may lead to
further international arrangements and agreements in this field, it
seems appropriate at this stage to intensify their co-operation and
consultation on issues relating to international investment and mul-
tinational enterprises through inter-related instruments each of
which deals with a different aspect of the matter and together con-
stitute a framework within which the OECD will consider these
issues:
DECLARE:
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
I. that they jointly recommend to multinational enterprises
operating in their territories the observance of the Guidelines as set
forth in the Annex hereto having regard to the considerations and
understandings which introduce the Guidelines and are an integral
part of them;
National Treatment
II. 1. that Member countries should, consistent with their
needs to maintain public order, to protect their essential security
interests and to fulfill commitments relating to international peace
and security, accord to enterprises operating in their territories and
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owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals of another
Member country ("Foreign-Controlled Enterprises") treatment
under their laws, regulations and administrative practices, con-
sistent with international law and no less favorable than that
accorded in like situations to domestic enterprises ("National
Treatment");
2. that Member countries will consider applying "National
Treatment" in respect of countries other than Member countries;
3. that Member countries will endeavor to ensure that their
territorial subdivisions apply "National Treatment;"
4. that this Declaration does not deal with the right of Member
countries to regulate the entry of foreign investment of the condi-
tions of establishment of foreign enterprises;
International Investment Incentives and Disincentives
1II. 1. that they recognize the need to strengthen their co-
operation in the field of international direct investment;
2. that they thus recognize the need to give due weight to the
interests of Member countries affected by specific laws, regulations
and administrative practices in this field (measures) providing offi-
cial incentives and disincentives to international direct investment;
3. that Member countries will endeavor to make such measures
as transparent as possible, so that their importance and purpose can
be ascertained and that information on them can be readily avail-
able;
Consultation Procedures
IV. that they are prepared to consult one another on the above
matters in conformity with the Decisions of the Council relating to
Inter-Governmental Consultation Procedures on the Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, on "National Treatment" and on Inter-
national Investment Incentives and Disincentives;
Review
V. that they will review the above matters within three years
with a view to improving the effectiveness of international economic
co-operation among Member countries on issues relating to interna-
tional investment and multinational enterprises.
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APPENDIX 11
Annex to the Declaration of 21st June 1976 by Governments
of OECD Member Countries on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
1. Multinational enterprises now play an important part in the
economies of Member countries and in international economic rela-
tions, which is of increasing interest to governments. Through inter-
national direct investment, such enterprises can bring substantial
benefits to home and host countries by contributing to the efficient
utilization of capital, technology and human resources between
countries and can thus fulfill an important role in the promotion of
economic and social welfare. But the advances made by multina-
tional enterprises in organizing their operations beyond the national
framework may lead to abuse of concentrations of economic power
and to conflicts with national policy objectives. In addition, the
complexity of these multinational enterprises and the difficulty of
clearly perceiving their diverse structures, operations and policies
sometimes give rise to concern.
2. The common air of the Member countries is to encourage the
positive contributions which multinational enterprises can make to
economic and social progress and to minimize and resolve the diffi-
culties to which their various operations may give rise. In view of
the transnational structure of such enterprises, this aim will be
furthered by co-operation among the OECD countries where the
headquarters of most of the multinational enterprises are estab-
lished and which are the location of a substantial part of their opera-
tions. The guidelines set out hereafter are designed to assist in the
achievement of this common aim and to contribute to improving the
foreign investment climate.
3. Since the operations of multinational enterprises extend
throughout the world, including countries that are not Members of
the Organization, international co-operation in this field should
extend to all States. Member countries will give their full support
to efforts undertaken in co-operation with non-member countries,
and in particular with developing countries, with a view to improv-
ing the welfare and living standards of all people, both by encourag-
ing the positive contributions which multinational enterprises can
make and by minimizing and resolving the problems which may
arise in connection with their activities.
4. Within the Organization, the program of co-operation to
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attain these ends will be a continuing, pragmatic and balanced one.
It comes within the general aims of the Convention on the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development and makes
full use of the various specialized bodies of the Organization,
whose terms of reference already cover many aspects of the role of
multinational enterprises, notably in matters of international trade
and payments, competition, taxation, manpower, industrial devel-
opment, science and technology. In these bodies, work is being car-
ried out on the identification of issues, the improvement of relevant
qualitative and statistical information and the elaboration of pro-
posals for action designed to strengthen inter-governmental co-
operation. In some of these areas procedures already exist through
which issues related to the operations of multinational enterprises
can be taken up. This work could result in the conclusion of further
and complementary agreements and arrangements between govern-
ments.
5. The initial phase of the co-operation program is composed of
a Declaration and three Decisions promulgated simultaneously, as
they are complementary and inter-connected, in respect of Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises, "National Treatment" for
"Foreign-Controlled Enterprises" and International Investment
Incentives and Disincentives.
6. The Guidelines set out below are recommendations jointly
addressed by Member countries to multinational enterprises operat-
ing in their territories. These guidelines, which take into account the
problems which can arise because of the international structure of
these enterprises, lay down standards for the activities of these en-
terprises in the different Member countries. Observance of the
guidelines is voluntary and not legally enforceable. However, they
should help to ensure that the operations of these enterprises are in
harmony with national policies of the countries where they operate
and to strengthen the basis of mutual confidence between enter-
prises and States.
7. Every State has the right to prescribe the conditions under
which multinational enterprises operate within its national jurisdic-
tion, subject to international law and to the international agree-
ments to which it has subscribed. The entities of a multinational
enterprise located in various countries are subject to the laws of
these countries.
8. A precise legal definition of multinational enterprises is not
required for the purposes of the guidelines. These usually comprise
companies or other entities whose ownership is private, state or
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mixed, established in different countries and so linked that one or
more of them may be able to exercise a significant influence over
the activities of others and, in particular, to share knowledge and
resources with the others. The degree of autonomy of each entity in
relation to the others varies widely from one multinational enter-
prise to another, depending on the nature of the links between such
entities and the fields of activity concerned. For these reasons, the
guidelines are addressed to the various entities within the multina-
tional enterprise (parent companies and/or local entities) according
to the actual distribution of responsibilities among them on the
understanding that they will co-operate and provide assistance to
one another as necessary to facilitate observance of the guidelines.
The word "enterprise" as used in these guidelines refers to these
various entities in accordance with their responsibilities.
9. The guidelines are not aimed at introducing differences of
treatment between multinational and domestic enterprises; wher-
ever relevant they reflect good practice for all. Accordingly, multi-
national and domestic enterprises are subject to the same expecta-
tions in respect of their conduct wherever the guidelines are relevant
to both.
10. The use of appropriate international dispute settlement
mechanisms, including arbitration, should be encouraged as a
means of facilitating the resolution of problems arising between
enterprises and Member countries.
11. Member countries have agreed to establish appropriate re-
view and consultation procedures concerning issues arising in re-
spect of the guidelines. When multinational enterprises are made
subject to conflicting requirements by Member countries, the gov-
ernments concerned will co-operate in good faith with a view to
resolving such problems either within the Committee on Interna-
tional Investment and Multinational Enterprises established by the
OECD Council on 21st January, 1975 or through other mutually
acceptable arrangements.
Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the Member
countries set forth the following Guidelines for Multinational En-
terprises with the understanding that Member countries will fulfill
their responsibilities to treat enterprises equitably and in accord-
ance with international law and international agreements, as well
as contractual obligations to which they have subscribed:
[Vol. 2
OECD Guidelines
General policies
Enterprises should
1. take fully into account established general policy objectives
of the Member countries in which they operate;
2. in particular, give due consideration to those countries' aims
and priorities with regard to economic and social progress, including
industrial and regional development, the protection of the environ-
ment, the creation of employment opportunities, the promotion of
innovation and the transfer of technology;
3. while observing their legal obligations concerning informa-
tion, supply their entities with supplementary information the lat-
ter may need in order to meet requests by the authorities of the
countries in which those entities are located for information relevant
to the activities of those entities, taking into account legitimate
requirements of business confidentiality;
4. favor close co-operation with the local community and busi-
ness interests;
5. allow their component entities freedom to develop their ac-
tivities and to exploit their competitive advantage in domestic and
foreign markets, consistent with the need for specialization and
sound commercial practice;
6. when filling responsible posts in each country of operation,
take due account of individual qualifications without discrimina-
tion as to nationality, subject to particular national requirements in
this respect;
7. not render-and they should not be solicited or expected to
render-any bribe or other improper benefit, direct or indirect, to
any public servant or holder of public office;
8. unless legally permissible, not make contributions to candi-
dates for public office or to political parties or other political organi-
zations;
9. abstain from any improper involvement in local political
activities.
Disclosure of information
Enterprises should, having due regard to their nature and rela-
tive size in the economic context of their operations and to require-
ments of business confidentiality and to cost, publish in a form
suited to improve public understanding a sufficient body of factual
information on the structure, activities and policies of the enterprise
as a whole, as a supplement, in so far as necessary for this purpose,
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to information to be disclosed under the national law of the individ-
ual countries in which they operate. To this end, they should pub-
lish within reasonable time limits, on a regular basis, but at least
annually, financial statements and other pertinent information re-
lating to the enterprise as a whole, comprising in particular:
i) the structure of the enterprise, showing the name and loca-
tion of the parent company, its main affiliates, its percentage own-
ership, direct and indirect, in these affiliates, including sharehold-
ings between them;
ii) the geographical areas*** where operations are carried out
and the principal activities carried on therein by the parent com-
pany and the main affiliates;
iii) the operating results and sales by geographical area and the
sales in the major lines of business for the enterprise as a whole;
iv) significant new capital investment by geographical area
and, as far as practicable, by major lines of business for the enter-
prise as a whole;
v) a statement of the sources and uses of funds by the enterprise
as a whole;
vi) the average number of employees in each geographical area;
vii) research and development expenditure for the enterprise as
a whole;
viii) the policies followed in respect of intra-group pricing;
ix) the accounting policies, including those on consolidation,
observed in compiling the published information.
Competition
Enterprises should, while conforming to official competition
rules and established policies of the countries in which they operate,
1. refrain from actions which would adversely affect competi-
tion in the relevant market by abusing a dominant position of mar-
ket power, by means of, for example,
a) anti-competitive acquisitions,
b) predatory behavior toward competitors,
c) unreasonable refusal to deal,
d) anti-competitive abuse of industrial property rights,
e) discriminatory (i.e., unreasonably differentiated) pricing
and using such pricing transactions between affiliated enterprises
as a means of affecting adversely competition outside these enter-
prises;
2. allow purchasers, distributors and licensees freedom to resell,
export, purchase and develop their operations consistent with law,
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trade conditions, the need for specialization and sound commercial
practice;
3. refrain from participating in or otherwise purposely strength-
ening the restrictive effects of international or domestic cartels or
restrictive agreements which adversely affect or eliminate competi-
tion and which are not generally or specifically accepted under appl-
icable national or international legislation;
4. be ready to consult and co-operate, including the provision
of information, with competent authorities of countries whose inter-
ests are directly affected in regard to competition issues or investi-
gations. Provision of information should be in accordance with safe-
guards normally applicable in this field.
Financing
Enterprises should, in managing the financial and commercial
operations of their activities, and especially their liquid foreign as-
sets and liabilities, take into consideration the established objec-
tives of the countries in which they operate regarding balance of
payments and credit policies.
Taxation
Enterprises should
1. upon request of the taxation authorities of the countries in
which they operate, provide, in accordance with the safeguards and
relevant procedures of the national laws of these countries, the infor-
mation necessary to determine correctly the taxes to be assesed in
connection with their operations, including relevant information
concerning their operations in other countries;
2. refrain from making use of the particular facilities available
to them, such as transfer pricing which does not conform to an arm's
length standard, for modifying in ways contrary to national laws the
tax base on which members of the group are assessed.
Employment and industrial relations
Enterprises should, within the framework of law, regulations
and prevailing labor relations and employment practices, in each of
the countries in which they operate,
1. respect the right of their employees, to be represented by
trade unions and other bona fide organizations or employees, and
engage in constructive negotiations, either individually or through
employers' associations, with such employee organizations with a
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view to reaching agreements on employment conditions, which
should include provisions for dealing with disputes arising over the
interpretation of such agreements, and for ensuring mutually re-
spected rights and responsibilities;
2. a) provide such facilities to representatives of the employ-
ees as may be necessary to assist in the development of effective
collective agreements,
b) provide to representatives of employees information
which is needed for meaningful negotiations on conditions of em-
* ployment;
3. provide to representatives of employees where this accords
with local law and practice, information which enables them to
obtain a true and fair view of the performance of the entity or, where
appropriate, the enterprise as a whole;
4. observe standards of employment and industrial relations
not less favorable than those observed by comparable employers in
the host country;
5. in their operations, to the greatest extent practicable, utilize,
train and prepare for upgrading members of the local labor force in
co-operation with representatives of their employees and, where
appropriate, the relevant governmental authorities;
6. in considering changes in their operations which would have
major effects upon the livelihood of their employees, in particular
in the case of the closure of an entity involving collective lay-offs or
dismissals, provide reasonable notice of such changes to representa-
tives of their employees, and where appropriate to the relevant gov-
ernmental authorities, and co-operate with the employee represent-
atives and appropriate governmental authorities so as to mitigate
to the maximum extent practicable adverse effects;
7. implement their employment policies including hiring, dis-
charge, pay, promotion and training without discrimination unless
selectivity in respect of employee characteristics is in furtherance of
establighed governmental policies which specifically promote
greater equality of employment opportunity;
8. in the context of bona fide negotiations**** with representa-
tives of employees on conditions of employment, or while employees
are exercising a right to organize, not threaten to utilize a capacity
to transfer the whole or part of an operating unit from the country
concerned in order to influence unfairly those negotiations or to
hinder the exercise of a right to organize;
9. enable authorized representatives of their employees to con-
duct negotiations on collective bargaining or labor management re-
lations issues with representatives of management who are author-
ized to take decisions on the matters under negotiations.
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Science and Technology
Enterprises should
1. endeavor to ensure that their activities fit satisfactorily into
the scientific and technological policies and plans of the countries
in which they operate, and contribute to the development of na-
tional scientific and technological capacities, including as far as
appropriate the establishment and improvement in host countries
of their capacity to innovate;
2. to the fullest extent practicable, adopt in the course of their
business activities practices which permit the rapid diffusion of
technologies with due regard to the protection of industrial and
intellectual property rights;
3. when granting licences for the use of industrial property
rights or when otherwise transferring technology do so on reasonable
terms and conditions.
NOTE: The Turkish government did not participate in the Declaration and abstained
from the Decisions.
*** For the purposes of the guidelines on disclosure of information the term
"geographical area" means groups of countries or individual countries as each enterprise
determines is appropriate in its particular circumstances. While no single method of grouping
is appropriate for all enterprises or for all purposes, the factors to be considered by an
enterprise would include the significance of operations carried out in individual countries or
areas as well as the effects on its competitiveness, geographic proximity, economic affinity,
similarities in business environments and the nature, scale and degree of interrelationship of
the enterprises' operations in the various countries.
**** Bona fide negotiations may include labor disputes as part of the process of negotia-
tion. Whether or not labor disputes are so included will be determined by the law and
prevailing employment practices of particular countries.
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APPENDIX III
DECISION OF THE COUNCIL
ON INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATION
PROCEDURES ON THE GUIDELINES
FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
The Council,
Having regard to the Convention on the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development of 14th December, 1960 and,
in particular, to Articles 2(d), 3 and 5(a) thereof;
Having regard to the Resolution of the Council of 21st January,
1975 establishing a Committee on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises and, in particular, to paragraph 2 thereof
[C(74)247(Final) ];
Taking note of the Declaration by the Governments of OECD
Member countries of 21st June, 1976 in which they jointly recom-
mend to multinational enterprises the observance of Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises;
Recognizing the desirability of setting forth procedures by
which consultations may take place on matters related to those
Guidelines;
On the proposal of the Committee on International Investment
and Multinational Enterprises;
Decides:
1. The Committee on International Investment and Multina-
tional Enterprises (the Committee) shall periodically or at the re-
quest of a Member country hold an exchange of views on matters
related to the Guidelines and the experience gained in their appli-
cation. The Committee shall periodically report to the Council on
these matters.
2. The Committee shall periodically invite the Business and
Industry Advisory Committee to OECD (BIAC) and the Trade
Union Advisory Committee to OECD (TUAC) to express their views
on matters related to the Guidelines and shall take account of such
views in its reports to the Council.
3. On the proposal of a Member country the Committee may
decide whether individual enterprises should be given the opportun-
ity, if they so wish, to express their views concerning the application
of the Guidelines. The Committee shall not reach conclusions on
the conduct of individual enterprises.
4. Member countries may request that consultations be held in
the Committee on any problem arising from the fact that multina-
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tional enterprises are made subject to conflicting requirements.
Governments concerned will co-operate in good faith with a view to
resolving such problems, either within the Committee or through
other mutually acceptable arrangements.
5. This Decision shall be reviewed within a period of three
years. The Committee shall make proposals for this purpose as ap-
propriate.
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APPENDIX IV
DECISION OF THE COUNCIL
ON NATIONAL TREATMENT
The Council,
Having regard to the Convention on the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development of 14th December, 1960 and,
in particular, Articles 2(c), 2(d), 3 and 5(a) thereof;
Having regard to the Resolution of the Council of 21st January,
.1975 establishing a Committee on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises and, in particular, paragraph 2 thereof
[C (74) 247 (Final) J;
Taking note of the Declaration by the Governments of OECD
Member countries of 21st June, 1976 on national treatment;
Considering that it is appropriate to establish within the Or-
ganization suitable procedures for reviewing laws, regulations and
administrative practices (measures) which depart from "National
Treatment;"
On the proposal of the Committee on International Investment
and Multinational Enterprises;
Decides:
1. Measures taken by a Member country constituting excep-
tions to "National Treatment" (including measures restricting new
investment by "Foreign-Controlled Enterprises" already estab-
lished in their territory) which are in effect on the date of this
Decision shall be notified to the Organization within sixty days after
the date of this Decision.
2. Measures taken by a Member country constituting new ex-
ceptions to "National Treatment" (including measures restricting
new investment by "Foreign-Controlled Enterprises" already estab-
lished in their territory) taken after the date of this Decision shall
be notified to the Organization within thirty days of their introduc-
tion together with the specific reasons therefore and the proposed
duration thereof.
3. Measures introduced by a territorial subdivision of a Mem-
ber country, pursuant to its independent powers, which constitute
exceptions to "National Treatment," shall be notified to the Or-
ganization by the Member country concerned, insofar as it has
knowledge thereof, within thirty days of the responsible officials of
the Member country obtaining such knowledge.
4. The Committee on International Investment and Multina-
tional Enterprises (the Committee) shall periodically review the
application of "National Treatment" (including exceptions thereto)
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with a view to extending such application of "National Treatment."
The Committee shall make proposals as and when necessary in this
connection.
5. The Committee shall act as a forum for consultations, at the
request of a Member country, in respect of any matter related to this
instrument and its implementation, including exceptions to
"National Treatment" and its application.
6. Member countries shall provide to the Committee, upon its
request, all relevant information concerning measures pertaining to
the application of "National Treatment" and exceptions thereto.
7. This Decision shall be reviewed within a period of three
years. The Committee shall make proposals for this purpose as ap-
propriate.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Ann.
APPENDIX V
DECISION OF THE COUNCIL
ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES
The Council,
Having regard to the Convention on the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development of 14th December, 1960 and,
in particular, Articles 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 3 and 5(a) thereof;
Having regard to the Resolution of the Council of 21st January,
1975 establishing a Committee on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises and, in particular, paragraph 2 thereof
[C(74)247(Final) ];
Taking note of the Declaration by the Governments of OECD
Member countries of 21st June, 1976 on international investment
incentives and disincentives;
On the proposal of the Committee on International Investment
and Multinational Enterprises;
Decides:
1. Consultations will take place in the framework of the Com-
mittee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises
at the request of a Member country which considers that its inter-
ests may be adversely affected by the impact on its flow of interna-
tional direct investments of measures taken by another Member
country specifically designed to provide incentives or disincentives
for international direct investment. Having full regard to the na-
tional economic objectives of the measures and without prejudice to
policies designed to redress regional imbalances, the purpose of the
consultations will be to examine the possibility of reducing such
effects to a minimum.
2. Member countries shall supply, under the consultation pro-
cedures, all permissible information relating to any measures being
the subject of the consultation.
3. This Decision shall be reviewed within a period of three
years. The Committee on International Investment and Multina-
tional Enterprises shall make proposals for this purpose as appropri-
ate.
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